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Abstract. This research aims to develop a model of trust and reputa-
tion that will ensure good interactions amongst software agents in large
scale open systems in particular. The following are key drivers for our
model: (1) agents may be self-interested and may provide false accounts
of experiences with other agents if it is beneﬁcial for them to do so; (2)
agents will need to interact with other agents with which they have no
past experience. Against this background, we have developed TRAVOS
(Trust and Reputation model for Agent-based Virtual OrganisationS)
which models an agent’s trust in an interaction partner. Speciﬁcally,
trust is calculated using probability theory taking account of past in-
teractions between agents. When there is a lack of personal experience
between agents, the model draws upon reputation information gathered
from third parties. In this latter case, we pay particular attention to
handling the possibility that reputation information may be inaccurate.
1 Introduction
Computational systems of all kinds are moving toward large-scale, open, dynamic
anddistributedarchitectures,whichharbournumerousself-interested agents.The
Grid is perhaps the most prominent example of such an environment and is the
contextofthispaper.However,inalltheseenvironmentstheconceptofself-interest,
which is endemic in such systems, introduces the possibility of agents interacting
in a way to maximise their own gain (perhaps at the cost of another). Therefore,
in such contexts it is essential to ensure good interaction between agents so that
no single agent can take advantage of the others in the system. In this sense, good
interactions can be deﬁned as those in which the expectations of the interacting
agents are fulﬁlled; for example, if the expectation of one of the agents is recorded
asacontractwhichisthenfulﬁlledbyitsinteractionpartner,itisagoodinteraction.
We view the Grid as a multi-agent system (MAS) in which autonomous soft-
ware agents, owned by various organisations, interact with each other. In partic-
ular, many of the interactions between agents are conducted in terms of Virtual
Organisations (VOs), which are collections of agents (representing individuals
or organisations), each of which has a range of problem-solving capabilities and
resources at its disposal. A VO is formed when there is a need to solve a problem
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or provide a resource that a single agent cannot address. Here, the problem of
assuring good interactions between individual agents is further complicated by
the size of the Grid, and the large number of agents and interactions between
them. Nevertheless, solutions to these problems are integral to the wide-scale
acceptance of the Grid and agent-based VOs [4].
It is now well established that computational trust is important in such open
systems [10]. Speciﬁcally, trust provides a form of social control in environments
in which agents are likely to interact with others whose intentions are not known.
It allows agents within such systems to reason about the reliability of others.
More speciﬁcally, trust can be utilised to account for uncertainty about the
willingness and capability of other agents to perform actions as agreed, rather
than defecting when it proves to be more proﬁtable. For the purpose of this work,
we use an adaptation of the deﬁnition oﬀered by Gambetta [5], and deﬁne trust
to be a particular level of subjective probability with which an agent assesses that
another agent will perform a particular action, both before the assessing agent
can monitor such an action and in a context in which it aﬀects the assessing
agent’s own action.
Trust is often built over time by accumulating personal experience with oth-
ers, and using this experience to judge how they will perform in an as yet unob-
served situation. However, when assessing our trust in someone with whom we
have no direct personal experience, we often ask others about their experiences
with this individual. This collective opinion of others regarding an individual is
known as the individual’s reputation and it is the reputation of a trustee that
we use to assess its trustworthiness, if we have no personal experience.
Given the importance of trust and reputation in open systems and their use
as a form of social control, several computational models of trust and reputation
have been developed, each with requirements for the domain to which they
apply (see [10] for a review of such models). In our case, the requirements can
be summarised as follows. First, the model must provide a trust metric that
represents a level of trust in an agent. Such a metric allows comparisons between
agents so that one agent can be inferred as more trustworthy than another. The
model must be able to provide a trust metric given the presence or absence of
personal experience. Second, the model must reﬂect an individual’s conﬁdence
in its level of trust for another agent. This is necessary so that an agent can
determine the degree of inﬂuence the trust metric has on its decision about
whether or not to interact with another individual. Generally speaking, higher
conﬁdence means a greater impact on the decision-making process, and lower
conﬁdence means less impact. Third, an agent must not assume that opinions of
others are accurate or based on actual experience. Thus, the model must be able
to discount the opinions of others in the calculation of reputation, based on past
reliability and consistency of the opinion providers. However, existing models do
not allow an agent to eﬃciently assess the reliability of reputation sources and
use this assessment to discount the opinion provided by that source (see Section
5 for a detailed discussion). To meet the above requirements, therefore, we have
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
basic TRAVOS model. Following from this, Section 3 provides a description of
how the basic model has been expanded to include the functionality of handling
inaccurate opinions from reputation sources. A scenario using these mechanisms
is then presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents related work. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper and provides an outline for future work.
2 The TRAVOS Model
TRAVOS equips an agent (the truster) with two methods for assessing the trust-
worthiness of another agent (the trustee). First, the truster can make the assess-
ment based on the direct interactions it has had with the trustee. Second, the
truster may assess the trustworthiness of another based on the reputation of the
trustee.
2.1 Basic Notation
In a MAS consisting of n agents, we denote the set of all agents as A =
{a1,a 2,...,an}. Over time, distinct pairs of agents {ax,a y}⊆Amay interact
with one another, governed by contracts that specify the obligations of each
agent towards its interaction partner. An interaction between a1 and a2 is con-
sidered successful by a1 if a2 fulﬁls its obligations. From the perspective of a1,
the outcome of an interaction between a1 and a2 is summarised by a binary vari-
able1, Oa1,a2, where Oa1,a2 = 1 indicates a successful (and Oa1,a2 = 0 indicates
an unsuccessful) interaction2 for a1 (Equation 1). Furthermore, we denote an
outcome observed at time t as Ot
a1,a2, and the set of all outcomes observed from
time t0 to time t as On:t
a1,a2.
Oa1,a2 =

1 if contract fulﬁlled by a2
0 otherwise (1)
At any point of time t, the history of interactions between agents a1 and a2 is
recorded as a tuple, Rt
a1,a2 =( mt
a1,a2,n t
a1,a2) where the value of mt
a1,a2 is the
number of successful interactions of a1 with a2, while nt
a1,a2 is the number of
unsuccessful interactions of a1 with a2. The tendency of an agent a2 to fulﬁl or
default on its obligations to an agent a1, is governed by its behaviour. We model
the behaviour of a2 towards a1, denoted Ba1,a2,a st h eintrinsic probability with
which Oa1,a2 = 1. In other words, Ba1,a2 is the expected value of Oa1,a2 given
1 Representing a contract outcome with a binary variable is a simpliﬁcation made
for the purpose of our model. We concede that in certain circumstances, a more
expressive representation may be appropriate.
2 The outcome of an interaction from the perspective of one agent is not necessarily
the same as from the perspective of its interaction partner. Thus, it is possible that
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complete information about a2’s decision processes and all environmental factors
that eﬀect its capabilities (Equation 2). For simplicity, we admit the subscripts
for B when the identity of the interacting agents is irrelevant to the discussion.
Ba1,a2 = E[Oa1,a2], where Ba1,a2 ∈ [0,1] (2)
In TRAVOS, each agent maintains a level of trust in each of the other agents
in the system. Speciﬁcally, the level of trust of an agent a1 in an agent a2,
denoted as τa1,a2, represents a1’s assessment of the likelihood of a2 fulﬁlling its
obligations. The conﬁdence of a1 in its assessment of a2 is denoted as γa1,a2.
Conﬁdence is a metric that represents the accuracy of the trust value calculated
by an agent given the number of observations (the evidence) it uses in the trust
value calculation. Intuitively more evidence would result in more conﬁdence. The
precise deﬁnitions and reasons behind these values are discussed in Sections 2.2
and 2.3 respectively.
2.2 Modelling Trust
The ﬁrst basic requirement of a computational trust model is that it should
provide a metric for comparing the relative trustworthiness of diﬀerent agents.
From our deﬁnition of trust, we consider an agent to be trustworthy if it has
a high probability of performing a particular action which, in our context, is
to fulﬁl its obligations during an interaction. This probability is unavoidably
subjective, because it can only be assessed from the individual viewpoint of the
truster, based on the truster’s personal experiences.
In light of this, we have adopted a probabilistic approach to modelling trust,
based on the individual experiences of any agent in the role of a truster. If
a truster, agent a1, has complete information about a trustee, agent a2, then,
according to a1, the probability that a2 fulﬁls its obligations is expressed by
Ba1,a2. In general, however, complete information cannot be assumed; the best
we can do is to use the expected value of Ba1,a2 given the experience of a1,w h i c h
we consider to be the set of all interaction outcomes it has observed. Thus, we
deﬁne the level of trust τa1,a2 at time t, as the expected value of Ba1,a2 given
the set of outcomes O1:t
a1,a2 (3).
τa1,a2 = E[Ba1,a2|O1:t
a1,a2] (3)
The expected value of a continous random variable is dependent on the
probability density function (pdf) used to model the probability that the vari-
able will have a certain value. Thus, we must choose such a function that is
suitable to our domain. In Bayesian analysis, the beta family of pdfs is com-
monly used as a prior distribution for random variables that take on continuous
values in the interval [0,1]. For example beta pdfs can be used to model the
distribution of a random variable representing the unknown probability of a
binary event [2]— B is an example of such a variable. For this reason, we use
beta pdfs in our model. (Beta pdfs have also been previously applied to trust
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The general formula for beta distributions is given in Equation 4. It has two
parameters, α and β, which deﬁne the shape of the density function when plotted.
Examples, plotted for B with various parameter settings are shown in Figure 1;
here, the horizontal axis represents the possible values of B, while the vertical
axis gives the relative probability that each of these values is the true value for
B. The most likely (expected value) of B is the curve maximum. The width of
the curve represents the amount of uncertainty over the true value of B.I fα
and β both have values close to 1, a wide density plot results, thus representing
a high level of uncertainty about B. In the extreme case of α = β =1 ,t h e
distribution is uniform, with all values of B considered equally likely.
f(b|α,β)=
b
α−1(1−b)
β−1 
Uα−1(1−U)β−1dU, where α,β > 0 (4)
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Fig.1. Example beta plots, showing how the beta curve shape changes with the pa-
rameters α and β
Against this background, we now show how to calculate the value of τa1,a2
based on the interaction outcomes observed by a1. First, we must ﬁnd values
for α and β that represent the beliefs of a1 about a2. Assuming that prior to
observing any interaction outcomes with a2, a1 believes that all possible values
for Ba1,a2 are equally likely, then a1’s initial settings for α and β are α = β =1 .
Based on standard techniques, the parameter settings in light of observations
are achieved by adding the number of successful outcomes to the initial setting
of α, and the number of unsuccessful outcomes to β. In our notation, this is
given in Equation 5. Then the ﬁnal value for τa1 is calculated by applying the
standard equation for the expected value of a beta distribution (Equation 6) to
these parameter settings.
α = m1:t
a1,a2 +1 a n d β = n1:t
a1,a2 + 1 where t is the time of assessment (5)
E[B|α,β]=
α
α + β
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2.3 Modelling Conﬁdence
In the previous section, we showed how an agent can establish trustworthiness
so that it can be used to compare the trustworthiness of diﬀerent agents. How-
ever, this method is susceptible to two problems created by the need for ade-
quate evidence (observations) to calculate a meaningful value for trust. Firstly,
an agent may not have interacted with another agent for which it is calcu-
lating a level of trust. This means that it has no personal experience and
mt
a1,a2 = nt
a1,a2 = 0. Secondly, an agent may have had few interactions and
observed outcomes with another. In both these cases, the calculated value of
τa1,a2 will be a poor estimate for the actual value of Ba1,a2. Intuitively, hav-
ing observed many outcomes for an event will lead to a better estimate for
the future probability for that event (assuming all other things are equal).
These problems create the need for an agent to be able to measure its con-
ﬁdence in its value of trust. To this end, we incorporate a conﬁdence metric
in TRAVOS, based on standard methods of calculating conﬁdence intervals
taken from statistical analysis.
Speciﬁcally, the conﬁdence metric γa1,a2 is a measure of the probability that
the actual value of Ba1,a2 lies within an acceptable level of error   about τa1,a2.
It is calculated using Equation 7. The acceptable level of error   inﬂuences
how conﬁdent an agent is given the same number of observations. For exam-
ple, if the number of observations remains constant, a larger value of   causes
an agent to be more conﬁdent in its calculation of trust than a lower value
of  .
γa1,a2 =
 τa1,a2− 
τa1,a2+  (Ba1,a2)α−1(1 − Ba1,a2)β−1dBa1,a2
 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
(7)
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Fig.2. Example beta plots showing how 3 agents’ opinions are aggregated to yield a
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2.4 Modelling Reputation
Until now, we have only considered how an agent uses its own direct observa-
tions to calculate a level of trust. However, by using conﬁdence, we can specify
a decision-making process in an agent to lead it to seek more evidence when
required. In TRAVOS, an agent a1 calculates τa1,a2 based on its personal ex-
periences with a2. If this value of τa1,a2 has a corresponding conﬁdence γa1,a2
below that of a predetermined minimum conﬁdence level, denoted θγ, then a1
will seek the opinions of other agents about a2 to boost its conﬁdence above
θγ. These collective opinions form a2’s reputation and, by seeking it, a1 can
eﬀectively obtain a larger set of observations.
The true opinion of a3 at time t, about the trustee a2, is the tuple, Rt
a3,a2 =
(mt
a3,a2,n t
a3,a2), deﬁned in Section 2.1. In addition, we denote the reported opin-
ion of a3 about a2 at time t as ˆ Rt
a3,a2 =( ˆ mt
a3,a2, ˆ nt
a3,a2). This distinction is
important because a3 may not reveal Rt
a3,a2 truthfully. The truster, a1, must
form a single trust value from all such opinions that it receives. An elegant
and eﬃcient solution to this problem is to enumerate all the successful and un-
successful interactions from the reports that it recieves (see Equation 8). The
resulting values, denoted Na1,a2 and Ma1,a2 respectively, represent the reputa-
tion of a2 from the perspective of a1. These values can then be used to calculate
shape parameters (see Equation 9) for a beta distribution, to give a trust value
determined by opinions provided from others. In addition, the truster takes on
board any direct experience it has with the trustee, by adding its own values for
na1,a2 and ma1,a2 with the same equation. The conﬁdence value γa1,a2 for this
combined distribution will be higher than for any of the component opinions,
because more observations will have been taken into account (see Figure 2).
Na1,a2 =
p 
k=0
ˆ nak,a2, Ma1,a2 =
p 
k=0
ˆ mak,a2, where p = number of reports (8)
α = Ma1,a2 +1 a n d β = Na1,a2 + 1 (9)
The desirable feature of this approach is that, provided Conditions 1 & 2 hold,
the resulting trust value and conﬁdence level is the same as it would be if all the
observations had been observed directly by the truster itself.
Condition 1. The behaviour of the trustee must be independent of the identity
of the truster it is interacting with. Speciﬁcally, the following should be true:
∀a2 ∀a3,B a2,a1 = Ba3,a1.
Condition 2. The reputation provider must report its observations accurately
and truthfully. In other words, it must be true that: ∀a2 ∀a3, Rt
a3,a2 = ˆ Rt
a3,a2.
Unfortunately, we cannot expect these conditions to hold in a broad range of
situations. For instance, a trustee may value interactions with one agent over an-
other, it might therefore commit more resources to the valued agent to increase
its success rate, thus introducing a bias in its perceived behaviour. Similarly, in200 J. Patel et al.
the case of a rater’s opinion of a trustee, it is possible that the rater has an in-
centive to misrepresent its true view of the trustee. Such an incentive could have
a positive or negative eﬀect on a trustee’s reputation; if a strong co-operative
relationship exists between trustee and rater, the rater may choose to overesti-
mate its likelihood of success, whereas a competitive relationship may lead the
rater to underestimate the trustee. Due to these possibilities, we consider the
methods of dealing with inaccurate reputation sources an important requirement
for a computational trust model. In the next section, we introduce our solution
to this requirement, building upon the basic model introduced thus far.
3 Filtering Inaccurate Reputation Reports in TRAVOS
Inaccurate reputation reports can be due to the reputation report provider being
malevolent or having incomplete information. In both cases, an agent must be
able to assess the reliability of the report passed to it. The general solution to
coping with inaccurate reputation reports is to adjust or ignore opinions judged
to be unreliable (in order to reduce their eﬀect on the trustee’s reputation).
There are two basic approaches to achieving this that have been proposed in
the literature; these can be referred to as endogenous and exogenous methods.
The former techniques attempt to identify unreliable reputation information by
considering the statistical properties of the reported opinions alone (e.g. [12,3]).
The latter techniques rely on other information to make such judgements, such
as the reputation of the source, or the relationship with the trustee (e.g. [1]).
Many proposals for endogenous techniques assume that inaccurate or unfair
raters will generally be in a minority among reputation sources. Based on this
assumption, they consider reputation providers whose opinions deviate in some
way from mainstream opinion to be those most likely to be inaccurate. Our so-
lution is also based on an endogenous approach, but we make our judgements on
an individual basis — we judge a reputation provider on the perceived accuracy
of its past opinions, rather than its deviation from mainstream opinion. More
speciﬁcally, we calculate the probability that an agent will provide an accurate
opinion given its past opinions, and later observed interactions with the trustees,
for which those opinions were given. Using this value, we reduce the distance be-
tween a rater’s opinion and the prior belief that all possible values for an agent’s
behaviour are equally probable. Once all the opinions collected about a trustee
have been adjusted in this way, the opinions are aggregated using the technique
described in Section 2.4.
In the following subsections we describe this technique in more detail: Section
3.1 describes how the probability of accuracy is calculated and then Section 3.2
shows how opinions are adjusted and the combined reputation obtained.
3.1 Calculating the Probability of Accuracy
The ﬁrst stage in our solution is to estimate the probability that a rater’s stated
opinion of a trustee is an accurate predictor of the trustee’s behaviour towards
the truster. More speciﬁcally, let ˆ τa3,a2 be the trust value calculated using ˆ Rt
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With this in mind, our goal is to calculate the probability that ˆ τa3,a2 = Ba1,a2.
We denote this probability as ρa1,a3 — the accuracy of a3 according to a1.I fa1
had observed suﬃcient direct interactions with a2, then it would already have
the means to calculate this probability: it is given using the beta pdf (Equation
4) with parameters set using a1’s direct experience with a2. Unfortunately, the
very reason that a1 seeks reputation information about a2 is because its direct
experience with a2 is not enough to make such a judgement accurately. However,
we can avoid this problem by taking advantage of the fact that Oa1,a2 is con-
ditionally independent of the identity of a2 given Ba1,a2. In other words, if we
had a set of agents C⊆A ,a n d∀ak ∈C ,∀al ∈C ,B a1,ak = Ba1,al, then regard-
less of which member of C we interacted with, the probability of that member
fulﬁlling its obligations would be the same. This means that we could calculate
E[Ba1,ak] using not only the outcomes of interactions with ak, but the outcomes
of all interactions with any member of C. In light of this, we can derive a beta
probability function based on the outcomes of all interactions for which a rater
gives the same value for ˆ τ — regardless of which agents these opinions were
given for. Using the parameter settings of this distribution, we can use Equation
4 to calculate ρa1,a3 for a given value of ˆ τa3,a2.
Two problems must be solved before this solution can work in practice. First,
the number of possible values of ˆ τa3,a2 is inﬁnite — we cannot in general expect
to see the same value of ˆ τa3,a2 more than once, so will never observe enough
contracts to estimate ρa1,a3 conﬁdently. Second, for the same reason, ρa1,a3 will
always be vanishingly small. We solve both of these problems by approximation.
All possible values for ˆ Ra3,a2 are split into bins according to the expected value
and standard deviation of the resulting beta distribution (Equation 10); a single
beta distribution is generated from all observations for which ˆ Ra3,a2 belongs to
a given bin. For each bin, the probability that the true value of Ba1,a2 lies within
the range of expected values belonging to that bin is calculated — it is this value
that we use for ρa1,a3. Calculation of this value is done by integrating Equation
4 over the expected value range of the bin.
σ =

αβ
(α + β)2(α + β +1 )
where σ is the standard deviation (10)
3.2 Adjusting the Reputation Ratings
Our goal in adjusting a reputation source’s opinion is to reduce the eﬀect of
unreliable opinions on a trustee’s overall reputation. To achieve this, we consider
the properties of a beta distribution, based on a single rater’s opinion, that
determine its eﬀect on the ﬁnal reputation value. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
expected value of the distribution and its standard deviation. Eﬀectively, by
adding a rating to a trustee’s reputation (Equation 8) we move the expected
value of the combined distribution in the direction of the rater’s opinion. The
standard deviation of the opinion distribution contributes to the conﬁdence value
for the combined reputation value but, more importantly, its value relative to
prior standard deviation determines how far towards the rater’s opinion the202 J. Patel et al.
expected value will move. However, the relationship between the change in the
expected value, and the standard deviation is non-linear. Consider as an example
three distributions d1, d2 and d3, with shape parameters, expected value and
standard deviation (denoted σ) as shown in Table 1; the results of combining d1
with each of the other two distributions are shown in the last two rows.
Table 1. Example beta distributions and the results of combining them
Distribution α β E[B] σ
d1 540 280 0.6585 0.0165
d2 200 200 0.5000 0.0250
d3 5000 5000 0.5000 0.0050
d1 + d2 740 480 0.6066 0.0140
d1 + d3 5540 5280 0.5120 0.0048
As can be seen, distributions d2 and d3 have identical expected values with
standard deviations of 0.025 and 0.005 respectively. Although the diﬀerence be-
tween these values is small (0.02), the result of combining d1 with d2 is quite
diﬀerent from combining d1 and d3. Whereas the expected value in the ﬁrst case
falls approximately between the expected values for d2 and d1, in the latter case,
the relatively small parameter values of d1 compared to d3 mean that d1 has
virtually no impact on the combined result. Obviously, the reason for this is due
to our method of reputation combination (Equation 8), in which the parame-
ter values are summed. This is an important observation because it shows how,
if left unchecked, an unfair rater could purposely increase the weight an agent
puts in its opinion by providing very large values for m and n, which in turn
determine α and β.
In light of this, we adopt an approach that signiﬁcantly reduces very high
parameter values unless the probability of the rater’s opinion being accurate is
very close to 1. Speciﬁcally, we reduce the distance between the expected value
and standard deviation of the rater distribution, and the uniform distribution,
α = β = 1, which represents a state of no information; we denote the standard
deviation of this uniform distribution as σuniform and its expected value as
Euniform. Returning to our example scenario of a rater agent a3 providing an
opinion to agent a1 about agent a2, this is performed according to Equations
11 and 12 respectively. In these equations, we use the over-bar, for example
¯ α, to indicate that we are referring to the adjusted distribution. Adjusting the
expected value as well as the standard deviation in this way results in a more
conservative estimate. This is important in cases in which few more reliable
ratings are available to mediate the expected value of the combined reputation.
¯ E = Euniform + ρa1,a3 · (E − Euniform) (11)
¯ σ = σuniform + ρa1,a3 · (σ − σuniform) (12)
Once all reputation opinions have been adjusted in this way, we sum the
ratings as normal according to Equation 8. To do this, we must calculate theA Probabilistic Trust Model for Handling Inaccurate Reputation Sources 203
adjusted values for ˆ ma3,a2 and ˆ na3,a2. It can be shown that the adjusted param-
eter values ¯ α and ¯ β, can be calculated according to Equation 13 and Equation
14. The new values for ˆ ma3,a2 and ˆ na3,a2 are then given by subtracting the prior
parameter settings from the adjusted distribution parameters (Eqn. 15).
¯ α =
¯ E2 − ¯ E3
¯ σ2 − ¯ E (13)
¯ β =
(1 − ¯ E)2 − (1 − ¯ E)3
¯ σ2 − (1 − ¯ E) (14)
¯ ma3,a2 =¯ α − 1,¯ na3,a2 = ¯ β − 1 (15)
4 TRAVOS in Action
This section provides an agent-based VO scenario in which we demonstrate the
use of TRAVOS. We begin by stating that there is a need to create a VO to
meet a speciﬁc requirement to provide a composite multimedia communication
service to an end user. The composite consists of the following basic services: text
messaging, HTML content provision and phone calls (this example is taken from
[9]). Now, assume agent a1 has identiﬁed this need and wishes to capitalise on the
market niche. However, a1 only has the capability to provide a text messaging
service. It can only achieve its goal by forming a VO with an agent that can
supply a service for phone calls and one for HTML content. For simplicity, we
assume that each agent in the system has the ability to provide only one service.
Agent a1 is aware of three agents that can provide a phone call service, and its
interaction history with these is shown in Table 2. Similarly, it is aware of three
agents that are capable of providing HTML content, and its past interactions
with these entities are given in Table 3.
Table 2. Agent a1’s interaction history with phone call service provider agents
Agent Past interactions
Successful Unsuccessful
a2 17 5
a3 2 15
a4 18 5
Table 3. Agent a1’s interaction history with HTML content service provider agents
Agent Past interactions
Successful Unsuccessful
a5 9 14
a6 3 0
a7 18 11204 J. Patel et al.
Agent a1 would like to choose the most trustworthy phone call and HTML
content service provider from the selection. The following describes how this is
achieved using TRAVOS. Before we calculate which of the possible candidates
are the most trustworthy, we must specify certain parameters that a1 requires.
First, we specify the level of error that a1 is willing to accept when determining
the conﬁdence in a calculated trust value as   =0 .2. Second, we specify that
θγ =0 .95, below which a1 will seek other’s opinions about the trustee.
4.1 Calculating Trust and Conﬁdence
Using the information from Tables 2 and 3, a1 can determine the number of
successful interactions n, and the number of unsuccessful interactions m,f o r
each agent it has interacted with. Feeding these into Equation 5, a1 can obtain
shape parameters for a beta distribution function that represents the behaviour
of each service provider agent. For example, the shape parameters α and β,f o r
a2, are calculated as follows:
Using Table 2: na1,a2 =1 7 , ma1,a2 =5 .
Using Equation 5: α =1 7+1=1 8and β =5+1=6 .
The shape parameters for each agent are then used in Equation 6 to calculate
a trust value for each agent that a1 is assessing. For example, the trust value
τa1,a2 for a2 is calculated as follows:
Using Equation 6: τa1,a2 = α
α+β = 18
18+6 =0 .75.
For a1 to be able to use the trust values it obtains for each agent, it must also
determine the conﬁdence it has in the calculated trust value. This is achieved
by using Equation 7 and the variable   (which in this scenario has been set to
0.2). For example, the conﬁdence γa1,a2 that a1 has in the trust value τa1,a2 is
calculated as shown below:
Using Equation 7:
γa1,a2 =
 τa1,a2− 
τa1,a2+  Bα−1(1 − B)β−1dB
 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
=
 0.55
0.95 Bα−1(1 − B)β−1dB
 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
=0 .98
Table 4. Agent a1’s calculated trust and associated conﬁdence level for HTML content
and phone call service provider agents
Agent α β τa1,ax γa1,ax
a2 18 6 0.75 0.98
a3 3 16 0.16 0.98
a4 19 6 0.76 0.98
a5 10 15 0.40 0.97
a6 4 1 0.8 0.87
a7 19 12 0.61 0.98
The shape parameters, trust values and associated conﬁdence for each agent,
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it is clear that the trust values for agents a2, a3 and a4, all have a conﬁdence
above θγ (=0.95). This means that a1 does not need to consider the opinions
of others for these three agents. Agent a1 is able to decide that a4 is the most
trustworthy out of the three phone call service provider agents and chooses it to
provide the phone call service for the VO.
4.2 Calculating Reputation
The process of selecting the most trustworthy HTML content service provider is
not as straightforward. Agent a1 has calculated that out of the possible HTML
service providers, a6 has the highest trust value. However, it has determined that
the conﬁdence it is willing to place in this value is 0.87, which is below that of
θγ and means that a1 has not yet interacted with a6 enough times to calculate
a suﬃciently conﬁdent trust value. In this case, a1 has to use the opinions from
other agents that have interacted with a6, and form a reputation value for a6 that
it can compare to the trust values it has calculated for other HTML providers
(a5 and a7).
Lets assume that a1 is aware of three agents that have interacted with a6,
denoted by a8, a9 and a10, whose opinions about a6 are (15,46), (4,1) and (3,0)
respectively. Agent a1 can obtain beta shape parameters based solely on the
opinions provided, by using Equations 9 and 8, as shown below:
Opinions from providers: a8 = (15,46),a 9 =( 4 ,1) and a3 =( 3 ,0)
Using Equation 8: N =1 5+4+3=2 2 ,M =4 6+1+0=4 7
Using Equation 9: α =2 2+1=2 3 ,β=4 7+1=4 8
Having obtained the shape parameters, a1 can obtain a trust value for a6
using Equation 6, as follows:
Using Equation 6: τa1,a6 = α
α+β = 23
23+48 =0 .32
Now a1 is able to compare the trust in agents a5, a6 and a7. Before calculating
the trustworthiness of a6, agent a1 considered a6 to be the most trustworthy (see
Table 4). Having calculated a new trust value for agent a6 (which is lower than
the ﬁrst assessment), agent a1 now regards a7 as the most trustworthy. Therefore
a1 chooses a7 as the service provider for the HTML content service.
4.3 Handling Inaccurate Opinions
The method a1 uses to assess the trustworthiness of a6, as described in Section
4.2, is susceptible to errors caused by reputation providers giving inaccurate
information. In our scenario, suppose a8 provides the HTML content service
too, and is in direct competition with a6.A g e n ta1 is not aware of this fact,
which makes a1 unaware that a8 may provide inaccurate information about a6
to inﬂuence its decision on which HTML content provider agent to incorporate
into the VO. If we look at the opinions provided by agents a8, a9 and a10,
which are (20,46), (4,1) and (3,0) respectively, we can see that the opinion
provided by a8 does not correlate with the other two. Agents a9 and a10 provide206 J. Patel et al.
a positive opinion of a6, whereas agent a8 provides a very negative opinion.
Suppose that a8 is providing an inaccurate account of its experiences with a6.
We can use the mechanism discussed in Section 3 to allow a1 to cope with this
inaccurate information, and arrive at a better decision that is not inﬂuenced by
self-interested reputation providing agents (such as a8).
Before we show how TRAVOS can be used to handle inaccurate information,
we must assume the following. Agent a1 obtained reputation information from
a8, a9 and a10 on several occasions, and each time a1 recorded the opinion
provided by a reputation provider and the actual observed outcome (from the
interaction with an agent to which the opinion is applied). Each time an opinion
is provided, the outcome observed is recorded in the relevant bin. Agent a1
keeps information of like opinions in bins as shown in Table 6. For example, if a8
provides an opinion that is used to obtain a trust value of 0.3, then the actual
observed outcome (successful or unsuccessful) is stored in the 0.2 <E [B] ≤ 0.4
bin.
Using the information shown in Table 6, agent a1 can calculate the weighting
to be applied to the opinions from the three reputation sources by applying the
technique described in Section 3.1. In so doing, agent a1 uses the information
from the bin, which contains the opinion provided, and integrates the beta dis-
tribution between the limits deﬁned by the bin’s boundary. For example, a8’s
opinion falls under the 0.2 <E [B] ≤ 0.4 bin. In this bin, agent a1 has recorded
that n =1 5a n dm = 3. These n and m values are used to obtain a beta dis-
tribution, using Equations 4 and 5, which is then integrated between 0.2 and
0.4 to give a weighting of 0.0039 for a6’s opinion. Then, by using Equations 11
and 12, agent a1 can calculate the adjusted mean and standard deviation of the
opinion, which in turn gives the adjusted α and β parameters for that opinion.
The results from these calculations are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Agent a1’s adjusted values for opinions provided by a8, a9 and a10
Agent Weighting Adjusted Values
µ σ α β
a8 0.0039 0.5 0.29 1.0091 1.0054
a9 0.78 0.65 0.15 5.8166 3.1839
a10 0.74 0.62 0.17 4.3348 2.6194
Summing the adjusted values for α and β from Table 5, a1 can obtain a more
reliable value for the trustworthiness of a6. Using Equation 4, a1 calculates a
trust value = 0.62 for a6. This means that from the possible HTML content
providers, a1 now sees a6 as the most trustworthy and selects it to be a partner
in the VO. Unlike a1’s decision in Section 4.2 (when a7 was chosen as the VO
partner), here we have shown how a reputation provider cannot inﬂuence the
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Table 6. Observations made by a1 given opinion from a reputation source. n represents
that the interaction (to which the opinion applied) was successful, and likewise m means
unsuccessful
[0,0.2] [0.2,0.4] [0.4,0.6] [0.6,0.8] [0.8,1] Total
n m n m n m n m n m
a8 2 0 11 4 0 0 0 0 2 3 25
a9 0 2 1 3 0 0 22 10 6 4 30
a10 1 3 0 2 0 0 18 8 5 3 25
5 Related Work
There are many computational models of trust, a review of which can be found
in [10]. Generally speaking, however, models not based on probability theory
(e.g. [6,11,8]) consist of calculating trust from hand-crafted formulae that yield
the desired results. For the purpose of our work, we only consider models that
are similar to TRAVOS in the manner of calculating trust.
Probabilistic approaches are not commonly used in the ﬁeld of computational
trust, but there are a couple of such models in the literature. In particular, the
Beta Reputation System (BRS) [7] is a probabilistic trust model like TRAVOS,
which is based on the beta distribution. The system is speciﬁcally designed for
online communities and is centralised. It works by users giving ratings to the
performance of other users in the community. Here, ratings consist of a single
value that is used to obtain positive and negative feedback values. The feedback
values are then used to calculate shape parameters that determine the reputation
of the user the rating applies to. However, BRS does not show how it is able to
cope with misleading information.
Whitby et al. [12] also build on the BRS and show how it can be used to
ﬁlter unfair ratings, either unfairly positive or negative, towards a certain agent.
In their model, the ratings for an individual are stored in a vector, which is then
used to obtain an aggregated reputation value for that individual (represented
as a beta distribution). However, this method is only eﬀective when there are
suﬃcient ratings to allow successful identiﬁcation of unfair ratings. Filtering
in this manner disregards the possibility of ratings that may seem unfair, but
which truthfully represent the perspective of the rater (as the rater may have
an inaccurate view of the world). In TRAVOS, no opinion is disregarded, and,
instead, the consistency between the reputation provider’s opinion and the actual
behaviour of an individual to which the opinion refers forms the weight that is
to be placed in opinions provided by that particular reputation source.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has presented a novel model of trust, TRAVOS, for use in open agent
systems. The main beneﬁts in using TRAVOS are that it provides a mechanism208 J. Patel et al.
for assessing the trustworthiness of others in situations both in which the agents
have interacted before and share past experiences, and in which there is little or
no past experience between the interacting agents. Establishing the trustworthi-
ness of others, and then selecting the most trustworthy, gives an agent the ability
to maximise the probability that there will be no harmful repercussions from the
interaction. In particular, through the example scenario, we have demonstrated
how TRAVOS can be used to handle inaccurate opinions expressed by reputation
providers. Here, reputation providers are requested to provide opinions about a
certain individual when an agent is not conﬁdent in the amount of evidence it
has in order to assess the trustworthiness of that individual. In this situation,
it is particularly important that the opinions that are given are accurate and
based on past experiences. By using TRAVOS, an agent ensures that opinions
from inaccurate reputation sources are not given equal weighting to those from
accurate sources in the aggregation of reputation. This gives the agent the ability
to handle inaccurate information eﬀectively.
In the short term, we will be carrying out empirical analysis on TRAVOS, and
evaluating it against similar approaches. As it stands, TRAVOS assumes that
the behaviour of agents does not change over time, but in many cases this is an
unsafe assumption. In particular we believe that agents may well change their
behaviour over time, and that some will have time-based behavioural strategies.
Future work will therefore include the removal of this assumption and the use
of functions that allow an agent to take into account the fact that very old
experiences may not be relevant in predicting the behaviour of an individual.
In addition we will extend the model to represent a continuous outcome space,
instead of the current binary outcome space. Further extensions to TRAVOS will
include using the rich social metadata that exists within a VO environment in
the calculation of a trust value. Thus, as described in Section 1, VOs are social
structures, and we can draw out social data such as roles and relationships that
exist both between VOs and VO members. The incorporation of such data into
the trust metric should allow for more accurate trust assessments to be formed.
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